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A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari:

QUESTION'S PRESENTED
Did the presiding panel of the Court of Appeal's render a dicision
in conflict with a dicision of another panel of the Court of Appeal's,
on the same issue of Law (State v. Haqen, Supea)?
Did the presiding panel of the Court of Appeal's render a dicision
substantially departing from the accepted and usual course of
Judicial Proceedings surmounting Jurisdictional challenge, that
sanctions inconsistant lower court procedure, mandating this court's
plenary power and corrective supervision?
Did the presiding panel of the Court of Appeal's decide a question
of federal interpretational law and statute that is in conflict
with Judicial Decision's and federal mandate of the United State's
District, Circuit, and U.S. Supreme Court's?
Did the presiding panel of the Court of Appeal's decide an important
question of Federal Law, that should be reviewed by, and settled
by, this Court?
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_TV_

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The
Utah Court Of Appeals For The State
Of Utah

Petitioner James F. Gardner, acting in Pro-Se capacity,
hereby respectfully pray's that a Writ of Certiorari issue to
review under presumption of correctness. The Final Judgement
and opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals for the State of Utah,
entered in the above-entitled Cause of Action on March 18,1992,
Judges, Bench, Billings, and Russon.
I
Opinion Below:
The memorandum opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is
attached as Appendix A.

No. opinion was issued by the District

Court for the Eighth Judicial District of Utah.
II
Jurisdiction;
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the State of Utah
was filed March 18, 1992.

The Jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked pursuant to Rule 42, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
Ill
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Other Citations involved
A.) Constitutional Provisions:
Article 1, Section 7;
"No person shall be deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property, without due process of the law", (1896).

Article 1, Section 25:
"This enumeration of Rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the People", (1896).
Article III, Ordinance 2:
[Rights to public domain disclaimed

Taxation of lands

exemption]
Second:

The People inhabiting this State do affirm and declare

that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within said limits owned or held by
any Indian or Indian Tribes, and that until the title thereto
shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United
States; and said Indian Lands shall remain under the absolute
Jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the

United

States, (1947).
B.) Federal Statutes involved:
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 (9 Stat. 108).
The Treaty of December 3, 1849 (9 Stat. 984).
The Executive Order of October 3, 1861 (I Kappler 900).
The Treaty of October 7, 1863 (13 Stat. 673: II Kappler 856).
The Act of May 5, 1864 (13 Stat. 63).
The Act of February 24, 1865 (13 Stat. 432).
The Unratified Treaty of June 8, 1865 (V Kappler 695).
The Treaty of March 2, 1868 (15 Stat. 619).
The Act of April 29, 1874 (18 Stat. 36).
The Act of June 18, 1878 (20 Stat. 165).
The Act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat. 199).

The Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984).
The Act of August 9, 1937 (50 Stat. 564, 573).
The Act of August 27, 1954 (68 Stat. 868).
The Act of July 14, 1956 (68 Stat. 873).
C.) Other Citations involved:
The Constitution and By-Laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation.
Public Law 717, 84th Cong., chap. 603, 2nd Sess, H.R.
7663 (1956).
Public Law 102-137, (October 28, 1991).
IV
Statement of Facts:
Petitioner James F. Gardner, was charged in the Seventh
(Eighth) Judicial District Court with a single count of second
degree feloney forgery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (3)(B)(1990).
He was found guilty as charged by jury trial on August 14,1985,
and sentenced to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State
Prison, (State-V-Gardner, case No. 85-CR-80-D).
On or about June 20, 1989, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief in the Trial Court, alleging that he had ask his
Trial Counsel to appeal his conviction shortly after Trial,
and that Counsel failed to honor that request.

Premised on

evidentiary proceedings, on April 2, 1990, the court found the
allegations to be true, and on April 19, 1990, the court resentenced the Petitioner Nunc-Pro-Tunc, allowing the perfection
of direct appeal.

*Other than miscellanious records, the following filing order
is relevent to this court's review:
On or about April 15, 1991, the Court of Appeals granted
the motion of counsel withdrawal, allowing Petitioner Gardner
to proceed in Pro-Se capacity for jurisdictional challenge,
(State-V-Gardner, case No. 900379-Ca, Utah App. 1992).
On or about May 17, and 29, 1991, Petitioner sought suspension of his appeal and filed various motions, including: motion for En Banc De Novo determination of criminal jurisdiction: and memorandum in support thereof: motion for leave of
remand for District Court fact-finding proceedings; and motion
and application of retroactive statutory interpretations; seeking in necessary foundation, Jurisdictional Challenge.
On or about June 10, 1991, the Court denied all said
motions, but not their own motion, preserved all issues raised
in those motions for plenary review of the case.
On or about July 3, 1991, Petitioner filed the appeal brief
before the Utah Court of Appeals, appealing the single issue of
Jurisdictional Challenge premised on Indian Status.
Petitioners appeal was extensive, raising issues of substial Constitutional guestion under the continuing claims doctrine; Petitioner addressed substantive guestions of State's
lack of criminal jurisdictional guildlines for Indian Status
jurisdictional challenge; The status Quo political seperation
from racial classification to Indian and federal jurisdictions;
Utah's ccnflict of interest in judicially defining and enforcing
jurisdictional matter over Indian Country by lack of Territorial

Authorities premised on Constitutional prohibitions of Article
III, Ordinance 2, (Ut. Const.);

Utah's recognition status of

the Uintah Mix-Blood Ute Indians in State Legislative Law:
Petitioner's Unequivical Indian Status under Uintah Ute Indian
Affiliation and Association standards for Criminal Jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C.§ 1151-1153: and the states unquestionable lack
of personal jurisdictions over Petitioner:
On or about October 7, 1991, respondant counsel, J. Kevin
Murphy, submitted his brief of appellee, in rebuttle of issues
raised by Petitioner;

The issues addressed by respondant counsel

consisted of claimed defense's that:
(I). The Jurisdictional problem was waived by Petitioner's
failure to raise it in the trial court because....(A)

To fall

outside State Jurisdiction under present law, defendant must
be Indian....(B)

The Jurisdictional problem in this case was

neither raised nor otherwise apparent to the trial court....
(C)

The Indian Status issue should be deemed waived by defen-

dant's failure to raise it in the trial court: and (II). If
Defendant is an Indian, he is subject to State Court Jurisdiction under the Federal termination of supervision over MixBlood Ute Indians; and (III). If the conviction cannot be
affirmed otherwise, the Jurisdictional Issue should be remanded
to the Trial Court where defendant should bear the burden of
proof....(A)

Because no evidence relating to Defendant's claimed

Indian Status was presented in the trial court, there is nothing to review on appeal....(B)

Defendant's Indian Status

claim should be heard by the trial court on limited remand....
and (C)

In the trial court, Defendant should bear the burden

On or about October 21, 1991, Petitioner filed his reply
brief of the appellant, rebutting respondant's claimed defenses
and issues raised, by clarifying to the court that....(I) Petitioner made dilegent effort to raise his Jurisdictional Challenge at trial court, and therefore, did not, and cannot waive
challenge of State Jurisdiction....(II) Petitioner is an Indian
and is subject to Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, in light of
his mother's termination of federal supervision as a Mix-Blood
Ute Indian.... and (III) The Jurisdiction Issues should be ruled
on as a matter of determinative law, with limited remand consistant with final decision of the court:
On or about November 4 and 19, 1991, Petitioner submitted
citations of supplemental authorites, surmounting historical
overview of issues raised.
On or about February 7, 1992, Petitioner submitted supplemental case law central and relevent to judicial plenary review, unequivically supporting Petitioner's claims and contentions. Also filed on This Day was, motion for leave to submit
other Historical and Genealogical Records in support of Petitioner's affidavit.

History, Document's and certifiable re-

cords unequivically supporting petitioner's ancestrial and aboriginal treaty relationship to the Uintah Band Ute Indians and
the Uintah Valley Reservation (Uintah and Ouray Reservation) as
a soveriegn, with additional case law reflecting the State's
inability to abrogate or abridge petitioner's treaty status.
On or about March 5, 1992, the Court of Appeal's denied
petitioner's motion to suppliment the record for support in
foundation of fact.

On or about March 18, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeal's rendered it's dicision over petitioner's appeal.

The court, after

establishing an overview of fact and Jurisdiction held that;
"The challenge to jurisdiction based on Indian status could concievably present a question of fact that would require remand for
an Evidentiary Hearing.

In the present case, however, remand is

unnecessary because Gardner has not asserted fact's sufficient to
challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court.
that he is a "Terminated Ute".

Gardner assert's

The term "Terminated Ute" is synony-

mous with "Mix-Blood" Ute as used in 25 U.S.C. 677.V, see:

Affili-

ated Ute Citizen's of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct.
1456, 1463 (1972).

Gardner further asserts that he is associated

with the Affiliated Ute Citizen's, an unincorporated association of
"Mix-blood" Ute's orginized pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 677.e.Id.
Therefore, even if we take as true the representations proffered in Gardner's affidavit, the trial court had Jurisdiction over
Gardner because exclusive federal jurisdiction over "Mix-blood"
Ute's has been terminated.

[Conclusion]

Gardner failed to pre-

sent facts sufficient to raise a jurisdictional challenge.

We there-

fore affirm his conviction.
Wherein, this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari has been submitted and Petitioner respectfully moves this Court to review and
vocate the final decision of March 18, 1992, as rendered by the
Panel of Judges, Bench, Billings and Russon, of the Utah Court of
Appeal's.

V
Reasons for Granting the Writ:
Point 1_.

This case provides this court full and fair opportunity
of correctness in clarifying the limits and boundries of
federal interpretation and statutory application of the
Ute Partition Act of 1954 (25 U.S.C.§§677-677AA.

(1988),

as it is applied to State Jurisdictional Authority and
Dependant Mix-blood members.

In the late 1940fs and 1950fs the United States Government
embarked on a Policy to terminate its special relationship with
American Indians as existed under the Constitution, treaties and
Laws of the United States.

Such Policies were contrary to the

promises and committments made to the American Indians, thier
respective Bands and Tribes.
The Ute Partition Act, also known as the Ute Termination Act,
was among several Acts passed by Congress in the furtherance of
this Policy, and effectively terminated the federal trust supervision over 490 Mix-blood Ute Indians and thier property, but did not
effect, by express congressional declaration, the said decendants
of the original 490 dependant members to the act.
The Ute Partition Act, codified At, 25 U.S.C. §§677-677,AA
(1954), made no express reference that the natural decendants of
the 490 Mix-bloods, were also subject to an ongoing conditioned
termination.

The only reference made regarding decendancy, par-

tained to Right of Inheritable Interest to Property.
Petitioner Gardner was born to the natural parents of Darrell
A. Gardner, an Uncompahgre Ute Indian, and Carma Colleen Reed Gard-

ner, a Uintah Ute Indian subject to effects of Termination, on
August 30, 1963, on the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation of
North-eastern Utah.

Petitioner is recognized under his respective

Uintah Band of the Ute Tribe, by other members therein, both Mixblood and Full-blood.

And retaines aboriginal, ancestrial, and

soveriegn status relationship under treaty to the Uintah Valley
Reservation.

And as clearly setforth in Petitioners Appeal breifs

before the Court of Appeals,

Petitioner is being wrongfully subject

to treatments of Termination, a termination that he was not consentually, constitutionally, statutorily and/or administratively a"Recognized dependant member of".
The Statefs utilization of the Ute Partition Act, to justify an
assumed congressional abrogation of petitioners soveriegn treaty
rights to exclusive tribal and federal criminal jurisdictions, absent federal termination and/or abrogation of said rights, support
an unconcionable and unconstitutional act, in direct violation of
Article 1, section 7, (Ut. Const.), and the due process clause of
the 1 4 t h Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
In the final dicision setforth on March 18, 1992, by the Utah
Court of Appeals, the court discrimatly applied a standard of
Plenary Review so contrary to Judicial norms, so as to constitute
a blatant violation of Petitioners protected safeguards in treaty
and constitutional law.
The court in an obvious attempt to succumb to state political
pressures, failed in proper application of Federal Interpretation
of relevant statutes, Public Laws and Indian Treaties, and simply
and arbitrarily created an unconstitutional "Blanket Cover" of
termination over all Indians of Mix-blood decent.

Procedure that

is simply ludicrous within the context of American Indian Law.
The Court indiscriminatly created plain error violations by misinterpreting and misrepresenting specific declarations exhibited
by Petitioner, and created statements interpreted as Petitioner's,
within the context in which they were not originally used, in an
attempt to curcumvent substantive arguments and contentions supported in determinative Law, throughout Petitioner's Appeal.
The only Judicial Rational before this Court of importance
concerning Point 1_ Infa, is that "the difference between treaty
right's and right's premised on Act's of Congress, are non-existant for purposes of Abrogating Indian Right's".

United States v.

Felter, 546 f. supp. 1002, 752 f. 2d 105 (10 t h Cir. 1985), and
that "All Law's effecting Indian's must be strictly construed".
Chapoose v. Clark, 607 f. supp. 1027 (D.C Utah 1985).
Quite to the contrary of the afore-mentioned legal rational,
the Court of Appeal's has taken a stand of Self-Interpretation of
Federal Law, without fundimental review of Relevent Law, carving
out an unconstitutional exception in violation of Article 1, section 7, (Ut. Const.), wherein, this Court's rational is supportive
of Petitioner's backdrop, that, the mandate of due process under
Article 1, Section 7, of the Declaration of Right's in Utah's
Constitution, "is comprehensive in its application to all activities of State Government, and that, it is the Provence of the
Judiciary to assume that a claim of the denial of due process by
an arm of State Government be heard, and if justified, that it be
vindicated".
(S. Ct. 1991).

Foot v. Board of Pardon's, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 3

For reasons in Point I_ Supra, alone, the Court of Appeal's
failed attempt to interperet federal law, created something that
it is not, and mandates the immediate vacating of the dicision
rendered on, March 18, 1992, by the Utah Court of Appeal's.

Point 2J[. This case provides this Court full and fair opportunity of correctness in clarifying the limits and boundries of Indian Status Jurisdictional challenge consistant with State Constitutional Provision's and State v.
Haqen. Supra;

It is unequivical that the issue of Jurisdictional challenge
may be raised at any time, and cannot be waived by failure to
raise it or by consent of the Partie's.

St. Cloud v. United

States, 702 f. supp. 1456, 1461 (D.C.D. 1988):

In Re Carmen's

Petition, 165 f. supp. 942, 950 (D.C. Cal. 1958), Aff'd

Sub, nom.,

Dickson v. Carmen, 270 f. 2d 809 ( 9 t h Cir. 1959), Cert. Denied,
361 U.S. 934, 80 S.Ct. 375, Reh' q Denied, 361 U.S. 973, 80 S.Ct.
585 (1960):

Wesley v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash. 2d 290, 346 P. 2d

658, 662 (1959) (_En Banc) .

It has also been historically accepted

that a jurisdiction challenge may be first raised on direct appeal.
State v. William's, 13 Wash. 335, 43 Pac. 15 (
Howard, 33 Wash. 250, 74 Pac. 387 (

) , and State v.

).

As setforth in Petitioner's statement of fact's, Petitioner
first raised Jurisdictional Challenge at trial stage to no avail.
Whereupon direct appeal, Petitioner sought proper remand to Trial
Court for Fact-finding Proceeding's necessary to establish foundation of fact for Appellat Review (May 29, 1991).

On June 10, 1991,

the Court of Appeal's firmly rejected Petitioner's request's
and motions for remand, while grantinq preservation of the issues
for Plenary Review.
Under Jurisdictional Challenge on Appeal, Petitioner setforth
substantial argument and supportive Law, that the Trial Court lack
personal, subject matter and territorial jurisdiction's over him,
due to his Indian status.

Premised on the Court's consistant re-

jection of Petitioner's request for limited remand, and the State's
"Open Invitation" for remand, Petitioner was forced to rely solely
on an affidavid of fact and geneology, as an attached addendum to
his Appeal Breif, see; Appendix A, dicision of March 18, 1992,
Utah Court of Appeal's: (Fact's; paragraph 3 ) .
Whether or not the Court of Appeal's properly followed an
ethical approach to review under plenary authority, remains a
Question of Law for this Court to determine, but it does seem
quite ironic that the Court initially deemed the facts of the case
sufficient for jurisdictional challenge under plenary review and
the doctrine of State v. Haqen, Supra, 802 P.2d 745 (Utah App.
1990), Cert. Granted, April 23, 1991, Utah Supreme Court, No.
910017.

And then to the contrary, affirmed Petitioner's conviction

premised on the grounds that "Gardner failed to present facts sufficient to raise a Jurisdictional Challenge".
Simply put, Petitioner met necessary prerequisit's for federal
criminal jurisdiction under the Haqen Doctrine and remains to be a
soveriegn under Treaty, to the Uintah Valley Reservation.
Because of the soveriegn status of Petitioner under Preserved
Treaty Provisions (See: Point III, Infra), Article III, Ordenance
2. (Ut. Const.) remains to be a relevent factor and substantive

question of State Constitutional Law, that this Court must address .
Article III, Ordanence 2, of Utah's Constitution provides in
Pertinent Part, that the people of this State forever disclaim
All right and title to the unappropriated public lands and lands
owned or held by any Indian or Indian Tribe, and that the same
Shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the
U.S. Congress.

Supported by additional facts that, (1.) the Ute

Indian Tribe has never ceded any form of Civil or Criminal Jurisdictional Authority over Indian Inhabitants or Indian Country, to
the State of Utah; (2.) That Indian Country includes all lands lying within the original exterior boundries of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation: (3.) That Congress has never allocated Civil or Criminal Jurisdictions inherent in the Ute Tribe, under Public Law 280,
to The State of Utah; (4.) That Public Law 102-137 of October 28,
1991, mandates that Tribal Governments assume Civil and Criminal
Jurisdiction over All Indians meeting Prerequisits to Indian Status, irrespective of Tribal enrollment and/or affiliation, and
leaving no exception for wrongful State encroachment: and (5.)
Each of the above cited Facts, stand consistant with Utah's Constitutional Disclaimer, evidencing the States unlawful stand and
continued prosecutions of soveriegn Uintah Ute Indians, whether
Mix-blood or not.

As setforth in Point III, Infra. The Uintah

Band Utes are the only soveriegn's to this Uintah Valley Reservation, and no Act's of Congressional Legislation has capped and/or
limited continued recognition in that Band, as the members therein
deem appropriate under Thier Standards.
As clearly defined in other cases of federal nature, the Uin-

tah Utes Treaty Rights

servived Termination.

United State's v.

Felter, 546 f. supp. 1002, 752 f. 2d 105 (10 t h Cir. 1985), and
the effects of Termination may only be applied to "Dependant members named by legislation to the Act".
As one Court held in Kimball v. Callahan, 590 f. 2d 768 ( 9 t h
Cir. 1979), citing Kimball I, the Termination Act that affected
that Tribe (Klamath's) did not abrogate Tribal Treaty Rights of
Hunting, fishing and trapping.

Neither did the Act affect the

Soveriegn Authority of the Tribe to regulate the exercise of those
Rights.

The District Court properly held, that the Termination

Act did not limit Treaty Rights to persons on the final roll, but
that those Soveriegn Rights, also extended to the Decendant's of
persons on the final roll.
by Decendants] * note:

Id at IV, [Exercise of Treaty Rights

The Klamath Tribe was Terminated in its

entirety.
The Utah Court of Appeal's indifference and faulty approach to
Plenary Review supports plain error violations mandating This
Courts Supervisory Powers of correctiveness and should be treated as such.
And the Court's total failure to address Substantive Constitutional Questions over Article III, Ordenance 2's, Disclaimer must
be deemed as a Judicial Referal to this Court's Supreme Authority.
See: Rose-Bud Sioux Tribe v. South Dakata, 900 f. 2d 1164 ( 8 t h
Cir. 199):

State v. Spotted Horse, 462 n.w. 2d. 463 (S.D.1990):

McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. ]64, 181
(1972): William's v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1958), and therefore
be despositively addressed as a matter of Determinitive Lav, and
thereby, vacate the final dicision of March 18, 1992, rendered by

Point III.This case provides this Court full and fair opportunity of State Level Indian Treaty Interpretational Review
of Uintah Band Ute Indians and thier Soveriegn Recognition Status to the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation
of North-eastern Utah.

The Utah Court of Appeal's in thier final decision of March
18, 1992, conclusively determined that Petitioner was seeking a
Jurisdictional Challenge to State Jurisdiction:

By the Courts

own conduct previously described, the Petitioner's direct appeal
was no more than an empty shell, leading the Petitioner in ongoing
futil attempts at securing foundation of fact.

And arbitrarily,

the Court went beyond thier refusal to except Petitioner's Affidavit supporting his Indian status, by refusing to allow the submition of supplimental attachments in support of the facts as established in the Affidavit, Records, Documents and effects that unequivically setforth Petitioner's Uintah Ute Ancestry and Aboriginal
Treaty status as a Soveriegn to the Uintah Valley Reservation (See,
Court Order of March 5, 1992), Including Certifiable Census Records
of the L.D.S. Church.
Whether the State chooses to acknowledge it or not, Petitioner
retains Treaty Rights to Federal and Tribal Jurisdictions through
the ancestry of Both his parents by virtue of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo of 1848 (9 Stat. 108), and the Treaty of December 3, 1849
(9 Stat. 984). Through his Father, an Uncompahgre Ute Indian, by
virtue of the Treaty of October 7, 1863 (13 Stat. 673: II Kappler
856), Through his Mother, a Uintah Band Ute, by virtue of the Unratified Treaty of June 8, 1856 (V Kappler 695), the Treaty of

March 2, 1868 (15 Stat. 619), and the Executive Order of October
3, 1861 (I Kappler 900)., and his aboriginal ancestry through
such subsequent Act's as follows:

The Act of May 5, 1864 (13

Stat. 63): Act of February 23, 1865 (13 Stat. 432):

Act of

April 29, 1874 (18 Stat. 36): Act of June 18, 1878 (20 Stat, 165):
Act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat. 199):
165):

Act of May 24, 1888 (25 Stat.

Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984):

(50 Stat. 564, 573):

Act of August 9, 1937

Act of August 27, 1954 (68 Stat. 868):

Act of July 14, 1956 (68 Stat. 873):

and the Constitution and By-

Laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation .
The Court of Appeal's has consistantly failed to acknowledge
Petitioner's soveriegn relationship to the reservation.

The issue

of Tribal Enrollment is irrelevent in the context of these proceedings as Plaintiff still retains treaty status and recognition,
association and affiliation under his respective band (Uintah and
Uncompahgre).

A recognition standard that has been established as

a matter of right through all of the above legislation, and had never been limited in scope or intent.
In 1934, the Uintah Band, Uncompahgre Band, and Whiteriver Bands
of Ute Indians, formed the Ute Indian Tribe pursuant to the reorginization Act of June 19, 1934, 35 U.S.C. 479, by adopting a constitution and by-laws recognizing the members of each of the three
Bands and providing that the individual bands and rights of thier
members in the bands, would continue.
As late as June of 1950, the Uintah Band, together with the
Uncompahgre and Whiteriver Bands, were entering into agreements
(See: 25 U.S.C. §672) as part of the Ute Partition Act, which re-

cognized the continued existance of the independant bands, including the Uintah Band, providing in 677. R., of the Act, that
"nothing in this subchapter shall affect any claim heretofore
filed against the United State's by the Tribe, or the individual
bands composing the Tribe".

In 1956, following the Ute Partition

Act, Congress adopted Public Law 717, 8 4 t h Cong.,Chap. 603, 2nd
Sess. H.R. 7663, that further recognized the continued existance
of the Bands, both Mix-blood and Full-blood.

*

Petitioner is a recognized Uintah Band member by other memb-

ers of the Band, and likewise, Petitioners Father is Uncompahgre
Ute by Band affiliation:
Legislative history between Congress and the Uintah and Uncompahgre Ute Indians has always been consistant in individual band
recognition

of individual members.

And the recognition standard

of band affiliation is clearly an aspect of Interpretational Law
that Congress has wisely chose to avoid.

And further, Congress

has never Granted Legeslative Passage allowing the State of Utah
authority to interperet the recognition status of the individual
bands contrary to legeslative exceptions of aboriginal and ancestrial recognition of its members.

For the State of Utah to take

such s stand would clearly violate the exclusive and absolute federal trust relationship between the Uintah Utes and the U.S. Government, and violate the soveriegn authority of the band itself, not
to mention due process

and equal protections of Petitioner, by

the State's knowing and willful violation of Treaty Provisions
Exclusive, and Petitioners Constitutional safeguards setforth in
Article 1, section 25, (Ut. Const.) which

Declares:

"This enumeration of Rights shall not be construed
to impair or deny others retained by the People'1 . (1896).
For reasons herein, plain error has been established, and the final decision of March 18, 1992, rendered by the Utah Court of Appeal's,
should forthwith, be vacated.

VI
Conclusion:

This case presents important constitutional questions and
issues regarding State Level Interpretation and review of Federal Statutes. Public Laws, and Treaties, in creation of Uniform
Jurisdictional Challenges to State Criminal Jurisdictions under
Constitutional Law.
This Court has an opportunity to clarify the limits and boundries of the Utah Court of Appeals Creation and Uniform Application
of, State v. Haqen, Supra, and State Court Challenges for Federal
Jurisdiction consistant with Utah's State Constitutional Disclaimer of Article III, Ordenance 2.
And this case clearly presents opportunity to Establish Interpretational Review of Relevent Legislation Creating Soveriegn Exception to Uintah Band Ute Indian Recognition, Association, and
Affiliation under Aboriginal and Ancestrial Treaty Provision's,
Guaranteeing Exclusive and Absolute Tribal and Federal Civil and
Criminal Jurisdictional Authorities.
This case has established a dangerous precedent which if not
Clarified, other lower Courts might unwisely choose to accept.
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BENCH, Presiding Judge:
James F. Gardner appeals his conviction of a single count of
forgery on jurisdictional grounds. We affirm.
FACTS
On August 14, 19S5, Gardner was convicted in state court of
forgery, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-501(3)(b) (1990). The evidence before the trial court
indicated that Gardner negotiated a check belonging to his
brother-in-law to Rebecca Neary in Roosevelt, Utah.1 Gardner was
sentenced to serve from one to fifteen years at the Utah State
Prison.

1. For purposes of this opinion, we assume that Roosevelt lies
within the boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation.
See Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072, 1188 (D.
Utah 1981). See also State v. Hagenr 802 P.2d 745, 746 (Utah
App. 1990), cert, granted/ 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).

Almost four years later, Gardner petitioned the trial court
for post conviction relief, seeking resentencing nunc pro tunc to
allow him to take a direct appeal, Gardner alleged that he
instructed trial counsel to appeal the forgery conviction and
believed an appeal had been taken, but that trial counsel had
failed to comply with his request. The trial court found the
allegations to be true, and resentenced Gardner in accordance
with State v. Johnson. 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981).
Now on appeal, Gardner alleges that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over him due to his Indian status* As an addendum
to his appellate brief, Gardner includes a personal affidavit in
support of his claimed Indian status.2 The affidavit states that
Gardner's paternal and maternal grandfathers were "full-blooded"
Ute Indians;3 that both his motherland his maternal grandmother
were enrolled as members of the Uintah band of the Ute tribe
until their status was terminated in 1954; that his father is
eligible for enrollment with the Uncompahgre Band of the Ute
tribe in Colorado; that Gardner is associated with the Uintah
Band of the Affiliated Ute Citizens; that Gardner is a second
generation "terminated Ute"; that Gardner was raised, educated,
and employed on the reservation; that Gardner practices Indian
religion by participation in Indian ceremonies and culture; and
that Gardner is known as an Indian rights activist.
JURISDICTION
Gardner alleges that the district court lacked jurisdiction
over him due to his claimed Indian status. "It has long been
held that exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians in
* Indian country7 includes all persons found to be xIndian7 under
federal law . . . ." Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F.

2. It is well settled that we do not review evidence presented for
the first time on appeal. Munns v. Munnsf 790 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah
App. 1990) . We therefore do not consider Gardner7s affidavit as
proof of the facts alleged therein.
3. 25 U.S.C. § 677a defines a "full-blood" Ute as "a member of
the tribe who possesses one-half degree of Ute Indian blood and a
total of Indian blood in excess of one-half, excepting those who
become mixed-bloods by choice. . . . " A "mixed-blood" Ute, by
comparison, is defined as "a member of the tribe who does not
possess sufficient Indian or Ute Indian blood to fall within the
full-blood class as herein defined, and those who become mixedbloods by choice under the provisions of section 677c of this
title." Id.

Supp. 1072, 1078 n.14 (1981) (citations omitted); see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (1984).
Between 1954 and 19 56, Congress carved out certain
exceptions to exclusive federal supervision over Indian property
and persons. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-1300. See also Affiliated Ute
Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 133, 92 S. Ct.
1456, 1462 (1972). Under 25 U.S.C. § 677, Congress terminated
federal supervision over trust property of the Ute Indian Tribe
on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, and ordered the partition
and distribution of tribal assets between "mixed-blood" and
"full-blood" members. As paft of that partition and
distribution, Congress terminated exclusive federal supervision
over "mixed-blood" Utes under 25 U.S.C. § 677v, which states, in
relevant portion, as follows:
All statutes of the United States which
affect Indians because of their status as
Indians shall no longer be applicable to such
member over which supervision has been
terminated, and the laws of the several
States shall apply to such member in the same
manner as they apply to other citizens within
their jurisdiction.
By terminating federal control over "mixed-blood" Utes, Congress
expressly transferred jurisdiction over them to state courts.
The challenge to jurisdiction based on Indian status could
conceivably present a question of fact that would require remand
for an evidentiary hearing. In the present case, however, remand
is unnecessary because Gardner has not asserted facts sufficient
to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court. Gardner
asserts that he is a "terminated Ute." The term "terminated Ute"
is synonymous with "mixed-blood" Ute as used in 25 U.S.C. 677v.
See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 1463 (1972). Gardner further asserts that
he is associated with the Affiliated Ute Citizens, an
unincorporated association of "mixed-blood" Utes organized
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 677e. Jd. .Therefore, even if we take as
true the representations proffered in Gardner's affidavit, the
trial court had jurisdiction over Gardner because exclusive
federal jurisdiction over "mixed-blood" Utes has been terminated.

CONCLUSION
Gardner failed to present facts sufficient to raise a
jurisdictional challenge. We therefore affirm his conviction,

jut&z&Ci & Jf^wC
Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge
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